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Elements d'Introduction Gin&ale 4 l'Etude des Sciences Juridiques: I. La
Difinition du Droit. By Henri Lvy-Ullmann, Professor of Civil Law at the
University of Lille. Paris, Rec. Sirey, 1917. pp. 176.
It has been aptly said that the definition of law is the battle ground of juris-
prudence. The author of the work under review has undertaken, as part of a
task involving a fundamental retxamination of the definition, classification and
general survey, theory and evolution of law, to present a criticism of existing
French definitions of law and to offer what he considers a satisfactory
all-embracing single definition Df the chameleonic term droit (law or right).
The difficulty of his task is enhanced by the varying meanings attached in
civil law countries to the abstract word droit, derecho, diritto, Recht or ius. It
is used, first, with an ethical connotation of "right,"; second, in the analytical
sense of a personal claim (right) to the performance of a correlative act or
to forbearance by another (duty), a concept described by civilians by prefixing
to "right" the word "subjective"; and third, as a body of rules of action
enforcible by the State, that is, law in general. Another set of words has also
been used to denote law, namely, loi, ley, legge, Gesetz, lea. In his exposition
and criticism of the various definitions of law which have been adopted by
different jurists, and in which now one and now the other of these two sets
of words have been emphasized, the author .has failed to point out, as Roscoe
Pound has so ably done, that the preponderance of the former set (jus, droit)
is identified with those periods of legal history in which the traditional element,
involving reason and justice or juristic reasoning, has prevailed; whereas the
latter set (lex, loi) is identified with periods of marked legislative activity,
such as followed the Reformation, the French Revolution and the growth of the
national State, that is, periods in which the imperative element has prevailed.
Definitions which contain both elements, e. g. those of Cicero, Blackstone and
others, evidence the transition period in which they lived.
Professor L6vy-Ullmann begins with the Romans. While paying tribute to
their superiority as the founders of the technique of legal science, he charges
them with having failed to bequeath to posterity a good definition of law.
Nevertheless, he shows that the Institutes of Justinian, borrowing from the
rules of Ulpian (himself, in this respect, the follower of Celsus) begin by
definitions of justitia, jurisprudentia and jus. Ulpian having lived in the
classical age of Roman legal development, we may well expect to find that
reason and justice prevail in his definition of law. Thus, justitia is "the con-
stant and perpetual will to assign to each his due" (jus suum) ; jurisprudentia
is "the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of what is just and
unjust"; and jus is "the art of what is right and equitable" The author might
have begun with Cicero (De Legibus) who lived in the intermediate period
between the Twelve Tables and the classical age when the imperative element
was a virile source of law. But the classical emphasis upon ethical standards
in the law, notably the maxims, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, sui cnique
tribuere laid the seed, in large degree, for the later development of natural
law-in which international law had to find its inspiration-and from which
positive law as the creation of the sovereign was subsequently distinguished;
and for the growth, beginning with Grotius, of schools of jurists concerned
with the origin and basis and, in more modern times, with the function of law.
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, law has been deemed to rest
successively on theology, reason, the nature of man, and history. Whether
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justice is the aim or the handmaid of law has been an element of controversy
among jurists who have essayed a definition of law. To this factor the author
has paid little attention in presenting definitions.
The general interest in Professor L6vy-Ullmann's work is greatly diminished
by reason of the facts (i) that he has not covered the period between Justinian's
Code and the beginning of the nineteenth century in France; (2) that the
definitions of modern French jurists, therefore, lack that historical explanation
which would vitalize their formal character; (3) that the philosophical theories
underlying the definitions are but rarely mentioned, and without these the
author's criticism is necessarily inadequate; and (4) that it is confined almost
solely to French jurists, whereas the theory and definition of law can hardly
be treated satisfactorily without a full discussion of the contributions of the
Historical School of Savigny, who identified "right" and "law," the Analytical
School of Austin and his followers, and the various disciples of the modern
Social-Philosophical School in Germany and elsewhere. He does mention the
definitions of Kant, Zachariae and Jhering, but without that comprehensive
setting in the history of legal thought which others have given and without
which one cannot intelligently evaluate their contributions to legal science.
Inasmuch as Professor L~vy-Ullmann professes to have prepared only an
elementary work for the use of first-year students-Americans will not find
it easy to understand that a book of i75 pages on the "definition of law" is
elementary-we can hardly hold him to account for the defects just mentioned,
which deprive the book of any general value to the more advanced student.
He divides the French authors of the nineteenth century who have defined
law (droit) into three categories:
(i) Those commentators of the Code Civil who identify law with loi (enacted
law), to whom droit is merely an appendage of loi, either subordinate or super-
imposed or confused with it. This is perhaps natural in a period following
the Revolution and the enactment of the French civil code, generally regarded
as the apotheosis of codification. In such a period it is usual for legal thought
to remain sterile. "Jurisprudence is the science of laws (lois)"; "Loi is a rule
established by a superior will to direct human actions" (Touillier); droit is
"the art of applying the lois"; or it is that "absolute justice" toward which
"laws" aim (Laurent). All this is not unnatural to a time when the imperative
element in law predominated, and in a country where judge-made law has little
if any force in establishing binding rules.
('2) Those writers who, instead of adopting one definition of law, enumerate
the principal aspects of droit and endow each with a special definition. This
school-among whom are Beudant, Vallette, G6ny, Baudry-Lacantinerie, Planiol
and Surville, whose method now seems to prevail in French legal education-
distinguished natural law from positive law and from "objective" law and
"subjective" right (droit). When we find an authority like Planiol defining
"subjective right" (droit) as "a faculty recognized in a person by the law,
which permits him to accomplish certain acts, e. g. a right of property," we
can appreciate that analytical jurisprudence has made but little impression in
France. The French seem to make no distinction between "right" and
"privilege."
(3) Those who give a single comprehensive definition of law. The author
approves in principle the single definition, but criticises those he quotes for one
reason or another. In the case of Aubry and Rau, who followed Zachariae,
our author concludes that law governs other relations than those merely of men,
and that external constraint may emanate from other authorities than the State.
Here, of course, he would find himself in opposition to Salmond, Holland and
most of the Anglo-American writers. Bufnoir's definition of law as "a body
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of rules to which the liberty of the individual is subjected in conflict with other
individuals," meets qualified approval. He emphasizes Bufnoir's original char-
acterization of "liberty" as the measure of law, although Kant in 1797, as the
author later admits, made "liberty" the purpose of law. He then criticizes the
utilitarians like Bentham and the sociological definitions of Richard, Tanon,
Jhering and Duguit who define law teleologically. Whereas Jhering proceeded
from the formal to the sociological, Lvy-Ullmann undertakes to reverse the
process. Definition by content or aim he disapproves. Demogue's definition
that "whatever is imposed by organized force, against which there is no
recourse" is law, while perhaps suited to modem international relations, will
hardly command general juristic support. Nor is it always the case, as J. C.
Gray and others have said, that enforcement in courts is necessary to make a
rule law. Indeed, in ex parte Larrucea (i917, S. D. Cal.) 249 Fed. 98i, the
rule laid down by the court was expressly reversed by the Executive as Com-
mander-in-Chief, as in conflict with a treaty immunity.
While admitting that law may be studied from the various points of view
above mentioned, the author then proceeds, on the basis of his previous criticism,
to present his own formal definition, which he believes embraces the various
aspects of "droit" (law as well as right). Beginning with a delimitation, a
legal rule and a legal sanction, an object and a subject, he posits this definition:
"Law is the delimitation of what men or groups have the liberty to do and not
to do, without incurring a penalty or damages or any particular exercise of
force."
Just as Austin's characterization of positive law as a command set by a
determinate sovereign to political inferiors, was too narrow, as excluding the
traditional element in law and those many rules which were never prescribed or
"set" by a sovereign, so Ldvy-Ullmann's definition seems too wide as embracing
in its permissive scope all rules of morals, ethics and religion. It is therefore of
little utility, it would seem, as a definition of law. It was recognition of this
weakness of formal definitions that has led modern jurists, like Jhering and
Vinogradoff, impressed by the growth in the imperative element in law, to define
law by its aim and function. While an individual act that is not prohibited,
i. e., that one is under no duty not to do, is privileged, one can hardly say with
profit to the understanding that the sum of all privileged acts constitutes law.
The definition is also defective in omitting all reference to the authority restrict-
ing liberty. As a matter of fact, study of Uivy-Ullmann's work indicates
the futility of attempting to define law conclusively for all time. It will
necessarily change in form, content and function in different periods, as the
point of view, the agencies which determine its content, and its purpose, ideals
and standards change. Again, at a given time men will disagree as to its
essential elements. For example, whether international law is law depends on
your definition of law, a fact which some controversialists on this subject have
not recognized.
But LUvy-Ullmann's work does arouse thought. Why should a book on the
definition of law appear in the midst of a great war? Because, as the author
intimates, great cataclysms in history have been marked by a renewed search for
fundamentals, and nations will, among their social institutions generally, rethink
their law. The period before us will doubtless witness a readjustment of the
relation of the individual to society and to the State and many phases of the
national and international economic system will undergo a metamorphosis.
These changes will necessarily be reflected in the law, which is merely a regu-
lative agency to delimit according to the mores of the time the conflicting
interests of individuals and of groups. It is not necessarily an instrument of
justice, but, primarily, of order and convenience, for the protection of the social
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interest in the security of transactions. In times of stress and rapid change,
with the growth in the imperative element in law there comes also a tempering
of the rigorous technicality of its rules in the administration of justice by a
larger exercise of judicial discretion. The greater the change the less technical
becomes the law and its administration, until, as in communistic Russia, in times
of martial law, and in extremes of backward society, as in certain parts of the
Orient, it is found possible to dispense with law in the administration of justice.
The extent of the political and economic change of the coming period will
measure the body of new rules which the law will assimilate.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of z787 and Their
Relation to a More Perfect Society of Nations. By James Brown Scott.
New York. 8vo. Oxford University Press. 1918. $2.oo.
In Paris there is gathered a group of men representing many peoples, engaged
upon the formidable task of creating a feasible league of nations. In the year
1787, the City of Philadelphia was the place of meeting of delegates sent by the
various States on the American continent.
In the book under review, the author has endeavored to find a precedent for
the former in the latter. Before developing his argument, he writes enter-
tainingly of the Convention of 1787, of the occasion that called it into being,
and of the qualifications and services of James Madison in reporting its pro-
ceedings.
The argument of the book is that the government created was a mere federa-
tion of states, and such being the case it is a proven fact that a league of
nations could exist without endangering the liberties of its constituent members.
It is therefore necessary that the author show that we have a Federated and
not a National government. This is the burden of the book.
Mr. Scott says that the Convention of 1787 was a conference between repre-
sentatives of independent nations . . . "a group apart from the society of
nations and held only loosely together by their common consent." In the
sense that the Constitution was assented to by people of independent nations,
this is so. But what they agreed to was not a treaty. It was an instrument
of government . . . . nothing more and nothing less. By ratifying it, the
people merely shifted powers of government from one' agency to another. It
was an act in furtherance of progressive development, not a mere restraint. He
then says that the Constitution created what he calls a Federation of States,
not a National Government of a common people. His idea is that the delegates
represented States and not the people of America; that "the term 'people' . ..
means the people of the States, not the people without reference to the States."
The Preamble is dismissed with the statement that it is not a delegation of
authority and therefore affords no evidence as to what is meant-a pure non
sequitur.
The author finds evidence of this in the fact that the delegates were originally
sent to represent the States; in the system of voting in the Convention; in
the suggestion made in the Convention that there was no necessity for the
creation of inferior Courts as uniformity could be obtained by allowing a direct
appeal from the State courts to the Federal Supreme Court; and in the rejection
of the plan to coerce the States through a Council of Revision. He argues it
on the fact of division of powers between the State and the National Govern-
ment, of the admission of new States on an equality with the old, of the theory
of representation in the House and Senate and their methods of voting, and
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on the compromises of the Constitution. And he considers the Constitution as
an elaboration of the Virginia plan rather than the mere basis on which pro-
ceedings began.
The Articles of Confederation constituted a compact, pure and simple-and
therein lay its defects. The Virginia plan presented to tle convention was of
a similar nature. The Constitution, on the contrary, was an instrument, national
in character, in the same sense as the State constitutions. In some respects the
States are sovereign; in others the government created. And this is all that the
cases cited by the author show.
It is true that the Constitution was not adopted'by the people at large.
They acted in units determined by State lines. But when adopted, it became
the act of the entire people, not of the State governments, and operated as in
that instrument intended. This idea is made plain by James Madison himself
in his speech before the Convention of Virginia, of June 6, 1788. It was
elaborated on by him in the 39th Federalist wherein he points out that the system
of government proposed was Federal in the manner of its adoption. "It
must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties
to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being
expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves."
Prior to amendment, the mode of election of Senators and of President specified
in the Constitution was Federal, but the election of members of Congress was
national. In that both State and Central governments are sovereign in their
spheres, the Constitution is in a sense Federal. In the method of amendment,
it partakes of the nature of both, and yet it is strictly neither. In its essential
characteristics, the government created is national, exercising a direct, exclusive
authority over the individual citizen within the sphere of its delegated powers.
No useful purpose can be served in pursuing the argument further. It is
sufficient to say that at one time in the history of this country the question was
widely discussed. For the arguments on both sides, the student is referred t9
the speeches of Calhoun, of Hayne, of Webster and of others of that bygone
time. The proposition has long since been settled adversely to the theory of the
author. In fact, the'Civil War finally terminated the argument.
The author then discusses the judicial system in this country and refers to
the fact that it is limited to judicial questions in contradistinction to political
questions; that our courts pass upon the constitutionality of acts of legislation
and have even decided cases to which different States were parties. He says
that a political question, while not judicial, may be made justiciable by agree-
ment, and therefore that the history of our country shows an international
judiciary under a Federation of Nations to be feasible. He even suggests the
use of the United States Supreme Court Reports by such a court.
In short, Mr. Scott believes our form of government offers a framework for
a league of nations, a United States of the world.
It may be that such a confederation might be successful. But our experience
does not prove it practicable in that the cases are not parallel. The Constitution
of the United States does not constitute a Federation of Nations. It is an
instrument of national government and not a mere league. It was created by
transferring from similar governments part of the authority in them vested by
peoples of independent states. But these peoples were descended from a
common stock, spoke the same language and were inspired by a common history.
They had been nurtured in the atmosphere of the Common Law of England
under identical governmental institutions, and for generations their trend of
political thought had been determined by the same considerations. A union
such as they formed was a normal condition.
A league of nations, on the contrary, is a diplomatic arrangement. It will
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be composed of all kinds and conditions of peoples, varying in language, ideals,
traditions, mode of political thought, even in civilization, some- of whom cannot
even understand the aspirations and motives of others.
The conditions are so different and the institutions created and to be created
so dissimilar that an argument can hardly be drawn from the one to prove the
practicability of the other.
The book, however, is an interesting contribution to the literature of the
subject. It is well written and well bound. The quality of paper used is good
and the type of fair size. Inserted in it is an Appendix containing the Declara-




Chamberlayne's Handbook on Evidence. By Charles Frederick Chamberlayne.
Edited by Arthur W. Blakemore and DeWitt C. Moore. Albany, Matthew
Bender & Co. igIg. pp. xxxiv, io24.
This handbook is a condensation of the five-volume work of Charles Frederick
Chamberlayne, entitled "The Modern Law of Evidence." It consequently -has
most of the virtues and faults of the original work. It shows no serious attempt
to correct or modify those parts of the original text which have been made the
subject of criticism; for example, the errors in sections 75 and 154 of the
original text, pointed out by the late Dean Thayer in his review of the first
two volumes of the work (25 HARvARD LAw REvrEw, 483-485), are repeated in
sections 41 and 61 of the handbook. The work also repeats Mr. Chamberlayne's
confusing use of the term "res gestae." On the other hand, Mr. Chamberlayne's
acute analysis of the subject is, of course, preserved and his fault of excessive
repetition is to a large extent cured. There is little new material in the hand-
book, although, of course, many cases decided since the publication of the
larger work have been cited. The editorial work shows a lack of proper care
and supervision; in many cases official citations are omitted, and in a few
instances cases are miscited. On the whole, however, the work will be of great
use to the profession, particularly to those practitioners who have become
acquainted with and accustomed to using the five-volume work.
EDMUND M. MORGAN.
Washington, D. C.
The Statute Law of Municipal Corporations in Massachusetts, with Historcal
Introductions Tracing the Development of the Law from its Beginning in
every Department of Municipal Government. By Frederick Huntley Magison
and Thomas Tracy Bouve. Albany, Matthew Bender & Co. 1p17. pp. xlv,
103r.
The title page of this volume correctly sets forth the extent and limitation
of the contents. The great mass of statutes-the authors say over twenty-three
hundred provisions are quoted-on municipal law (except as to taxation and
election) are set forth verbatim. The historical introductions are both interest-
ing and instructive from period to period, and time and again demonstrate the
tremendous growth in the number of functions and the mass of business of
modern cities and towns as compared with those of the eighteenth and even of
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the first half of the nineteenth centuries. It is a pity that the authors felt it
necessary to limit their original contributions to historical matter. Municipal
law is a specialty; the average lawyer knows very little about it; there are
very many of the statutes which are blind to him, and many which perplex
even the experienced city solicitor or town counsel. There is need for text book
work to explain and correlate. One fears that the inexperienced may have
difficulty in getting the correct statute law, even though it be all in one volume
instead of in fifteen or so. To take an example or two at random; What is a
relocation as distinguished from an alteration of a way? The county commis-
sioners and the selectmen have concurrent jurisdiction to relocate county ways
(highways) and bridges. Who can relocate a town way? The statutory pro-
visions are scattered. The only index notation of relocation is as to the item
of expense in connection with the relocation of highways. Chapter 263 of the
General Acts of 1915 seems to permit takings by cities and towns for any
municipal purposes. What is the effect of it on the various special provisions
as to libraries, schools, water-works, parks, playgrounds and town hall sites?
There is no cross reference. All of these provisions, except as to town hall
sites, though referring equally to cities and towns, are contained in that part
of the chapter on Cities which deals with eminent domain. The provision as
to taking land for a town-hall site is set forth in the chapter on Towns, under
the heading of "Corporate Powers" and is not in the index under eminent
domain.
The confused state of the statutes themselves has perhaps inevitably led to
difficulties of arrangement, classification and indexing. As illustrations, Chapter
4oi of the Acts of 1913 admitting in land damage cases certain evidence of
assessed valuations, is twice referred to in the text, but has not been found in
the table of statutes nor in the index. Chapter I is entitled "Towns," Chapter
2 is entitled "Cities," yet a small fraction of town law is included in the
former and the bulk of the statutes in the latter concern both cities and towns,
as do the rest of the chapters, each of which is devoted to some municipal
department or function. In the chapter on Municipal Finance, improperly called
"Municipal Indebtedness," Part V. on "Auditing of Municipal. Accounts" set
forth the law as to the appointment of city auditors but not as to the appoint-
ment of town accountants, or the election of town auditors. The Town
Accountant Act is in Part IIL of the same chapter, but the law as to town
auditors is in the first chapter in the parts on town elections and town officers.
The lack of even an explanatory foot-note or cross reference is confusing.
There is comment in the introduction to the chapter on Roads and Bridges on
the alternative offices of highway surveyors and road commissioners, but no
mention there of the third and modern method of handling the street depart-
ment through a superintendent of streets. This last official is incorrectly
included in page 5 among the officers chosen by election at Town Meeting, and
again on page 28 the law as to his appointment is inserted under the incorrect
heading "Appointment if not Elected."
A score or nore of archaic or misleading provisions in Massachusetts
municipal law have just been revised in pursuance of a bill reported by a Com-
mission to Revise and Codify the Laws relating to Towns. It is to be hoped
that as a result of the further recommendations of that Commission and as a
result of the work of the Commission now sitting to consolidate the general laws
of the Commonwealth, its municipal law may be brought to an orderly and com-
paratively modern condition. It is also to be hoped that the authors of the
present work may then issue a second edition with an enlarged index and with
text interpreting the statutes in the light of practice and decisions. In the
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meantime, municipal officers and lawyers are indebted to them for much assist-
ance in tracing the development of the law and in cornering it between the
covers of one volume.
CHARLEs F. DuTcH.
Boston, Mass.
A Source-Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation. Prepared by the
War Department Committee on Education and Special Training. St. Paul,
West Publishing Co. 1919. pp. xviii, 858. $4.5o.
This book was prepared for a special purpose-to supply, with the Manual of
Courts-Martial, material for a course in Military Law and War-Time Legisla-
tion which formed part of the prescribed curriculum of law school units of the
Student Army Training Corps. The termination of the war before the book
came from press has deprived the publishers of that special class of readers to
whom it was primarily addressed, and has rendered unnecessary any critical
analysis of it as teaching material for the proposed course. But the book is
not without interest to a broader public, for it collects in convenient form war
legislation and judicial opinions on a number of topics which are of -importance
to practicing attorneys. Notably of this character is the section dealing with
the effect of war on civil rights and liabilities. The collection of opinions of
the Judge Advocate General is also useful because only digests of such opinions
are published elsewhere.
T. W. S.
The Armed Neutralities of 178o and r8oo. A Collection of Official Documents.
Edited by James Brown Scott. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918.
pp, xxxi, 697. $5.oo.
Les Conventions et Declarations de la Haye de 1899 et r907. Dotation Carnegie
pour la Paix Internationale. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918.
pp. xxxiii, 318. $2.50.
Federal Military Pensions in the United States. By William H. Glasson.
Edited by David Kinley. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp.
xii, 305. $2.OO.
Early Economic Effects of the European War upon Canada. By Adams Shortt.
Early Effects of the European War upon the Finance, Commerce, and
Industry of Chili. By L. S. Rowe. New York, Oxford University Press.
1918. pp. xvi, I01. $I.00.
Une Cour de Justice -Internationale. By James Brown Scott. New Yorl,
Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. vi, 269.
The Treaties of r785, 1799, and 1828 between the United States and Prussia.
Edited by James Brown Scott. New York, Oxford.University Press. 1918.
pp. viii, 207. $2.00.
The Financial History of Great Britain, 1914-1918. By Frank L. McVey. New
York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. v, io. $.0O0.
Economic Effects of the War upon Women and Children in Great Britain. By
Irene Osgood Andrews. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. x,
Igo. $1.00.
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German Legislation for the Occupied Territories of Belgium. Official Texts.
Edited by Charles H. Huberich and A. Nicol-Speyer. The Hague, Martinus
Nyhoff. i918. 15th series, pp. 518, i6th series, pp. 649.
Reports of the Forty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association.
Vol. xliii. 1918. Charles A. Morrison, Official Reporter. Baltimore, The
Lord Baltimore Press. 1918. pp. 867.
The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies. By Beverley W. Bond, Jr.
New-Haven, Yale University Press. igig. pp. 492. $3.00.
Constitutional Power and World Affairs. By George Sutherland. New York,
Columbia University Press. 1918. pp. vii, 202. [To be reviewed.]
Problems of the War. Papers read before the Grotius Society in r9r8. London,
Sweet and Maxwell. pp. lvi, 293. [To be reviewed.]
Law as a Vocation. By Frederick J. Allen. With an introduction by William
Howard Taft. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1919. pp. viii, 84.
$i.OO. [To be reviewed.]
A Practical Treatise on Title to Real Property. By George W. Thompson.
Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company. I919. pp. lxxxii, 1112. $7.50.
[To be reviewed.]
American Labor and the War. By Samuel Gompers. New York, George H.
Doran Company. i919. pp. x, 377. [To be reviewed.]
A History of the United States. By Cecil Chesterton. New York, George H.
Doran Company. 1919. pp. xix, 333.
American Business in World Markets. By James T. M. Moore. New York,
George H. Doran Company. i919. pp. xi, 320.
The Freedom of the Seas. By Louise Fargo Brown. New York, E. P. Dutton
& Company. r9g. pp. xvi, 262. [To be reviewed.]
A Society of States. By W. T. S. Stallybrass. New York, E. P. Dutton &
Company. 1919. pp. xvi, 243 [To be reviewed.]
A Manual of Maine Probate Law and Practice. By Ralph W. Leighton.
Boston, Little, Brown & Company. i919. pp. xxi, 499. $5.00. [To be
reviewed.]
Clark on Interstate Commerce. Testimony given before the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce. By Edgar E. Clark. Washington, John Byrne &
Company. i919. pp. x1xix, 262. [To be reviewed.]
Legal and Political Status of Women in Iowa. By Ruth A. Gallaher. Iowa
City, The State Historical Society of Iowa. 1918, pp. xii, 300. $2.50.
Effects of the War upon Insurance. By William -F. Gephart. New York,
Oxford University Press. 1918. pp, viii, 302. $1.00.
Traditions of British Statesmanship. By Hon. Arthur D. Elliot New York,
Dodd, Mead & Company. I919. pp. x, 231. $3.50. [To be reviewed.]
A Treatise on Federal Taxes. By Henry Campbell Black. Fourth Edition.
Kansas City, Vernon Law Book Company. IgI9. pp. xxxi, 704. $6.00. [To
be reviewed.]
The Army and The Law. By Garrard Glenn. New York, Columbia University
Press. I918. pp. iv, 197.
